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I. INTRODUCTION
Given the changing nature of the working world,' engaging workers
cultivates contentious and consequential questions for policy makers, the
Inland Revenue, the Internal Revenue Service, corporations, and individuals.
In Great Britain, as in the United States, the common law seems to make rather
fine distinctions which may "depend heavily on the facts of an individual
case."' Identifying whether a worker is an employee or an independent
contractor can have immense consequences. For example, the determination
that a sharecropper parent is a "share farmer" may preclude the application of
child-labor protection for Alejandra Sanchez, an eleven-year-old cucumber
picker Further examples include the retention of Donna Vizcaino and the
' Professor of Law and Faculty Director University of Detroit Mercy, London Law
Programme, M.A. Wayne State University, M.B.A., University of Michigan, J.D. Wayne State
University and P.G.C.E., University of Bristol. The author wishes to thank the following
reviewers of earlier drafts: Elizabeth McKay, Diana Davis, and Emma Garrow. In addition, the
author benefitted from extensive discussions with Judith Purcell about the changes- in the
location and categories of work. The usual caveat applies. The author also wishes to thank the
staff at the Bodleian Library, Oxford University for assistance.
British spellings have been preserved in quotations.
See Henrietta L. Moore, The Future of Work, 33 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 657 (1995) (noting
increases in the number of women, flexible specialization, and work from home based on
information technology are part of the changes in the workplace); Clyde W. Summers,
Contingent Employment in the United States, 18 CoMP. LAB. L. 503 (1997) (explaining the use
of workers who do not fit the traditional model of work has greatly increased during the past
twenty years). In addition, the content of the employment contract in Great Britain has changed
radically during the past twenty years. See Douglas Brodie, Commentary: Specific Performance
and Employment Contracts, 27 INDUS. L.J. 37 (1998).
2 Evan McKendrick, Who is an Employee? A ContextualApproach?, 25 INDUS. L.J. 136,
136-37 (1996). As one observer notes, "Historically, in both England and the United States,
employment law was a branch of domestic relations or family law, built largely on the model
of domestic servants." Summers, supra note 1, at 503.
' See Jeanne M. Glader, Note, A Harvest of Shame: The Imposition of Independent
Contractor Status on Migrant Farmworkers and Its Ramifications for Migrant Children, 42
HASTINGS L. J. 1455 (1991). There is a persistent trend in agricultural labor "among major
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deployment of a night taxi driver. Vizcaino, a professional, was hired pursuant
to a written agreement in which she explicitly agreed to embrace independent
contractor status; but that did not preclude her from changing her mind and
later successfully suing her principal on the ground that she is actually an
employee and therefore entitled to retroactive employment benefits. A night
taxi driver lost his claim to redundancy payments although the owner sold the
cab and the driver was made redundant. The court held that the night driver
was not an employee in spite of the vehicle having been used during the day
by the owner who paid for the fuel, insurance, and maintenance of the car and
took 65% of the gross turnover.'
In this trio of cases, covering two distinct jurisdictions, the courts had to
wrestle with the notions of independent contractor and employee. Historically,
the employment relation was conceived as generally having
three dominant characteristics. First, it was a personal
relationship between a dominant master or employer and a
servient worker. Second, it was full-time, that is for the full
normal work week. Third, it was generally assumed to
continue for a substantial period.. .
Today, "[t]he complex form of modern industrial and commercial organisation
enables people to work under a variety of legal arrangements which may be
entirely satisfactory to all concerned, but which are difficult to rationalise into
well-defined categories necessary for the purpose of legal analysis."7 Nowhere
is this dilemma more apparent than in the elusive distinction between what
British courts and employment tribunals call "contracts of service" and
"contracts for services." While that dilemma implicates United Kingdom law,
its underlying conceptual distinctions find echoes in many other jurisdictions
as well. Historically, in Britain as in many other countries, the archaic concept
of "master-servant" has provided some kind of benchmark; but it is neither
growers to classify migrant farmworkers as'independent contractors' rather than 'employees.'"
Id. at 1455. Such a classification enables growers to avoid the expense of complying with the
worker/child labor protection provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. at 1456.
4 See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Paul Kellogg,
Note, Independent Contractor or Employee: Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 35 HoUS. L. REV.
1775 (1999).
See Challinor v. Taylor, 1972 I.C.R. 129.
6 Summers, supra note I, at 503.
7 NORMAN M. SELWYN, SELWYN's LAW OF EMPLOYMENT 38 (9th ed. 1996).
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comprehensive nor always relevant.8 Courts, employment appeals tribunals,
employment tribunals, and legislators also endeavor to distinguish "workers"
from nonworkers. 9 Additional stratums of analysis arise out of the confusing
notion of self-employment and the appropriate test to be employed to detect
whether or not a particular type of worker is self-employed. In fact, it is not
always easy to determine how to distinguish between dependent and
independent labor. Aside from assorted common law tests, statutory
definitions of employees and workers are also in operation in Great Britain.'0
The aim of this article is to explain the appropriate distinction between
what has been labeled a "contract of service" from a "contract for services"
and to show that this distinction engenders a rather circular process that leads
ineluctably to overlapping tests. In addition, standards for identifying the
appropriate tests for explicating the distinction between employment and
independent contractor status themselves lead to the possible conflation and
repetition of such tests as they are applied to a given set of facts. An
additional purpose is to determine whether the determination of an individual
as either an employee or an independent contractor is an issue of fact or of law.
Lastly, this article applies an expanded conception of economic, social, and
bureaucratic subordination as a construct which clarifies both British and
American labor law in this arena.
II. THE COMMON LAW TESTS
The distinction between dependent and non-dependent labor takes the form
of the classification of workers as either employees or self-employed or
independent individuals." "Unlike the civil law systems of Continental
Europe which moved from a general theory of contract toward a specific
concept of an autonomous contract of employment, British labor law only
slowly conceptualised the contract of employment on a case by case basis."' 2
8 See id.
9 See id.
'0 In addition, Great Britain must comply with European Community Directives. As yet,
European Directives seem silent on the definition of "employed" and "self-employed." While
agencies exist to match self-employed individuals with firms, observers argue that the distinction
between employee and self-employed is becoming ever more obsolete in Europe's increasingly
outsourced and information based society. See ROGER BLANPAIN & CHRIS ENGELS, EUROPEAN
LABOUR LAW 243 (5th ed. 1998).
See SIMON DEAKIN & GILLIAN S. MORRIS, LABOUR LAW 149 (2nd ed. 1998).
12 BOB HEPPLE & SANDRA FREDMAN, LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN GREAT
BRITAIN 77 (2nd ed. 1992).
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This conceptualization was grounded in pre-industrial notions of "service."' 3
Thus, at common law, there "developed a distinction between those under a
contract for service (self-employed workers) and those under a contract of
service (employees)."' 4
Typically, "employees are subject to the employer's common law powers
of direction and control which, if they do not take the form of express contract
terms, tend to be read into the contract as implied terms."' 5 Furthermore, those
individuals classified as employees (and sometimes those classified as
workers) come under the scope of limited statutory employment protection and
also social security legislation. As such, "they may benefit from statutory
rights to wage protection, income maintenance and compensation for loss of
employment. By contrast, few of the burdens or benefits of dependent status
apply to a relationship in which the worker is self-employed." 6 This is
important given the changes in the labor force in England "from the pattern of
full-time employment in the core of the labour market, toward part-time
temporary and 'self-employed' work."' 7 In reality, many workers may be
categorized as dependent labor."8
In assessing whether an individual is, or should be, classified as an
employee pursuant to a contract of service or as a self-employed person under
a contract of services, employment tribunals and courts employed many
varied, and at times contradictory, tests. These tests/rules are often deployed
"on a casuistic basis."' 9 Yet, the importance of determining dependence
cannot be overstated. Moreover, to the extent that the worker is classified as
an independent contractor (that is under a contract for services) but in
13 See id.
"' Id. Notably, the "English common law category of 'employee' is often narrower than the
range of persons under a contract of employment in a civil law system." Id.
15 DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 11, at 149. One perceptive source disputes whether
thinking of the individual employment relationship in contract terms is useful. See PAUL DAVIES
& MARK FREEDLAND, KAHN-FREUND'S LABOUR AND THE LAW (1983). On the contrary, this
source asserts that "[i]n its inception it is an act of submission, in its operation it is a condition
of subordination, however much the submission and the subordination may be concealed by that
indispensable figment of the legal mind known as the 'contract of employment.' "Id. at 18; see
also LORD WEDDERBURN, LABOUR LAW AND FREEDOM: FURTHER ESSAYS IN LABOUR LAW I I l -
13(1995).
16 DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 11, at 149. To be sure, most systems of"labour law draw
a fundamental distinction between employment which is categorised as 'dependent' or
,subordinate' and that which is 'independent' or 'autonomous.' "Id.
17 HEPPLE & FREDMAN, supra note 12, at 77.
"8 See id. For a discussion of how to identify dependent labor, see DEAKIN & MORRIS,
supra note 11, at 149-182.
"9 HEPPLE & FREDMAN, supra note 12, at 78.
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substance functions as an employee, the worker may be denied the benefit of
employment protection laws consistent with common law and judicial
interpretations.20
A. Case Illustrations
Several recent cases illustrate the complexity of the calculus in detecting
whether or not dependent labor is present. In Express and Echo Publications
Ltd. v. Tanton,2' the Court of Appeal was called upon to decide a case
involving Tanton, who was first engaged as an employee driver for his
employer. Then he was made redundant. Finally, he was reassigned as a
driver on what the company intended to be a self-employed basis not
withstanding Tanton's objection to this new status. In January 1996, Tanton
received a copy of a document titled "An Agreement For Services."22 Clause
3.3 within this document provided that if Tanton "is unable or unwilling to
perform the services personally he shall arrange at his own expense entirely
for another suitable person to perform the services., 23 Tanton refused to sign
the agreement.24
The Employment Tribunal25 decided that (1) it was the employer's intention
that Tanton be self-employed, and at one point both sides agreed on this fact;
(2) at the outset Inland Revenue considered Tanton as an employee; (3) the
proposed January 1996 contract (which Tanton refused to sign) clearly placed
Tanton outside of the employment relationship; (4) Tanton's duties included
picking up newspapers and delivering them pursuant to a fixed route set by the
appellant; (5) the employer provided Tanton with both a vehicle and a
uniform; (6) the remuneration was a fixed fee per journey determined by the
employer; (7) Tanton received no sick or holiday pay; (8) Tanton had, and
2 See Hugh Collins, Independent Contractors and the Challenge of Vertical Disintegration
to Employment Protection Laws, 10 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD., 353, 355 (1990) [hereinafter
Collins, Independent Contractors]. •
2 1999 Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 367 (C.A.).
22 Id.
23 Id. at 368.
24 See id.
25 Employment Tribunals, until recently, were referred to as Industrial Tribunals. They
consist of a legal chairperson and two lay members. The chairperson can be either a barrister
or a solicitor and may be full-time or part-time. The lay members, who are all part-time, are
selected from a panel drawn up after consultation with representatives of employers'
organizations and trade unions. See DEAKIN AND MORRIS, supra note II, at 84-92. Decisions
by Employment Tribunals are appealable to Employment Appeals Tribunals. See SELWYN,
supra note 7, at I-13.
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utilized, the right to employ a substitute driver, whom he compensated.26 Of
paramount importance was the degree of control that the employer appeared
to exercise over Tanton.27 Accordingly, the tribunal decided that he was an
employee under a contract of service.28
This decision was sustained by the Employment Appeals Tribunal.29
Before the Court of Appeal, the employer maintained that the Employment
Tribunal committed legal error in its approach to determining whether or not
Mr. Tanton was engaged under a contract of employment. Specifically, it was
asserted that the tribunal should: (a) discern what the terms of the agreement
were between the parties (a question of fact), (b) consider whether any of the
contract terms were inherently inconsistent with the existence of a contract of
employment (a question of law), and (c) if no inherently inconsistent terms
were apparent, determine whether the contract was a contract of service or a
contractfor services based on the entire agreement (a mixed question of law
and fact).
Relying on Ready Mixed Concrete South East Ltd. v. Minister of Pensions
and National Insurance,0 the Court of Appeal found that an agreement
allowing the hiring of substitutes is inconsistent with an employment
relationship (contract of services).3' Under Ready Mixed Concrete, a contract
of service exists if the following three conditions are fulfilled:
(i) The servant agrees that, in consideration of a wage or other
remuneration, he will provide his own work and skill in the
performance of some service for his master.
(ii) He agrees, expressly or impliedly, that in the performance
of that service he will be subject to the other's control in a
sufficient degree to make that other master.
26 See Tanton, 1999 Indus. Rel. L. Rep. at 368.
27 See id.
28 See id.
29 See id. Employment Appeal Tribunals "consist[] ofjudges of the High Court nominated
by the Lord Chancellor in England, and the Lord President of the Court of Session in Scotland,
plus other members (appointed on the joint recommendations of the Lord Chancellor and the
Secretary of State) who have special knowledge or experience of industrial relations as
representatives of employers or of workers." SELWYN, supra note 7, at I 1-12.
'0 1968 Q.B. 497. Ready Mixed Concrete continues to be heavily cited by Employment
Tribunals, by Employment Appeals Tribunals, the Court of Appeal, and the Privy Council. See
Clark v. Oxfordshire Health Auth., 1998 Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 125 (C.A.); Cheng Yuen v. Royal
Hong Kong Golf Club, 1998 I.C.R. 131.
3' See Tanton, 1999 Indus. Rel. L. Rep. at 369.
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(iii) The other provisions of the contract are consistent with
its being a contract of service.32
In reality, this method might be called an opened-ended approach.33
Although this test has "been cited with approval on numerous occasions, in its
first two stages it represents little more than a repetition of the test of personal
control. 34 In addition, it can be argued that the "third stage adds nothing,
since it neither indicates what the core features of the contract of service (or
employment) are, nor which features are necessarily inconsistent with it."35
Lastly, the test invites the courts to "engage in a balancing act, the outcome of
which may be almost impossible to predict in advance. 36 In any case, guided
by the uncertain direction furnished by Ready Mixed Concrete, the Court of
Appeal in Tanton counseled that the servant must provide his own personal
work and skill.37 Freedom to complete a job either by one's own hands or by
another's is inconsistent with a contract of employment.38 Furthermore, the
Court of Appeal concluded that there must be "an irreducible minimum of
obligation on each side to create a contract of service."39
Given that Tanton was not obliged to perform any services personally since
he was free to select a substitute, there was not the irreducible minimum
obligation necessary on each side to create an employer-employee
relationship. 40 The fact that Tanton was not required to work personally for
the putative employer precludes the mutuality of obligations required to
establish a contract of service. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal held that
Tanton worked under a contract for service-that is, he was an independent
contractor.4
In Lee Ting Sang v. Chung Chi-Keung,42 the Privy Council was required to
decide a case involving casual construction work. There, the issue was
whether an individual whom the building contractor paid primarily on a piece
rate basis and who was not supervised was an employee for purposes of
32 See Ready Mixed Concrete, 1968 Q.B. at 515.
3 See DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 11, at 168.
34 Id.
35 id.
36 Id. at 168-69.
"7 See Tanton, 1999 Indus. Rel. L. Rep. at 369.
31 See id.
31 Id. at 369 (citing Ready Mixed Concrete, 1968 Q.B. 497).
40 See id.
41 See id. at 370.
42 1990 W.L.R. 1173.
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claiming compensation for injury at work.43 To decide this issue, the court
used the following test:
[I]s the person who has engaged himself to perform these
services acting as a person in business on his own account?
If the answer to that question is 'yes,' then the contract is a
contract for services. If the answer is 'no,' then the contract
is a contract of service. No exhaustive list has been compiled
and perhaps no exhaustive list can be compiled of the consid-
erations which are relevant in determining that question, nor
can strict rules be laid down as to the relative weight which
the various considerations should carry in particular cases.
The most that can be said is that control will no doubt always
have to be considered, although it can no longer be regarded
as the sole determining factor; and that factors which may be
of importance are such matters as whether he hires his own
helpers, what degree of financial risk he takes, what degree of
responsibility for investment and management he has, and
whether and how far he has an opportunity of profiting from
sound management in the performance of his task."4
The worker, Lee Ting Sang, was a mason who suffered a head injury at
work. He had been told to work at a particular site, had been given a plan
showing him where to chisel, and worked unsupervised except for periodic
inspections by the main contractor.45 Normally he was paid based on the
amount of concrete he chiseled.46 In addition, Lee Ting Sang worked from
time to time for other contractors. On these facts, the Privy Council, if sitting
as the trier of fact, would have had no difficulty in concluding that he was an
employee and not an independent contractor. The Privy Council found the
authority cited in Market Investigations Ltd. to be very persuasive. Most
specifically, Lee Ting Sang did not provide his own equipment nor did he hire
41 See id.
44 Lee Ting Sang, 1990 W.L.R. at 1176 (citing Market Investigations Ltd. v. Minister of
Soc. Sec., 1969 Q.B. 173, 184-85). Numerous cases reference Market Investigations Ltd.
including: Cheng Yuen v. Royal Hong Kong Golf Club, 1998 I.C.R. 131, 134; Lane v. Shine
Roofing, 1995 Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 493,496 (C.A.); Carmichael v. National Power, 1993 Indus.
Rel. L. Rep. 301.
41 See Lee Ting Sang, 1990 W.L.R. at 1173.
46 See id.
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his own helpers.47 While he worked for other contractors, he gave the
contractor at issue in this case highest priority. In addition, he had no
management or investment obligations.49 While he was not supervised in his
work, this was not a dispositive consideration given that he was a skilled
worker. From these facts, this portrait emerges: a skilled artisan earning his
living by working for more than one employer as an employee and not as a
small businessperson with attendant risks.5" Despite this conclusion, the Privy
Council had to decide whether the lower court decision finding that Lee Ting
Sang was an independent contractor constituted an error of law or of fact; if
of fact, there would be no appeal, but if of law, an appeal would be allowed.5
The Privy Council found an error of law and therefore overturned the decision
of the lower courts.52
In another recent case, Cheng Yuen v. Royal Hong Kong Golf Club,"3 the
Privy Council had to decide whether a dismissed golf caddie, Cheng Yuen,
was an employee or an independent contractor. Cheng Yuen worked at a club
that (1) directed for whom he worked, (2) exercised disciplinary and
supervisory powers over him, and (3) paid him for rounds worked (although
the employer was reimbursed for caddie's fees by individual golfers).54
However, he had no obligation to appear for work. While the club trained him,
equipped him with a uniform and a locker, and strictly controlled his jobs,
Cheng Yuen received neither sick pay nor holiday pay, nor did he have the
benefit of a pension scheme. The trial court determined that he was an
employee of the club rather than an independent contractor. 55 The Privy
Council found that the failure of the tribunal to consider whether the claimant
had contracted with individual golf players rather than with the club amounted
to a misdirection that justified setting aside the tribunal's decision.56
41 See id. at 1177.
41 See id.
49 See id.
'o See id.
5' See Lee Ting Sang, 1990 W.L.R. at 1178.
52 See id. at 1181-82.
'3 See 1998 I.C.R. 131.
14 See id. at 131-32.
" See id. at 132.
56 See id. The pertinent Hong Kong statute was Employment Ordinance (ch. 57) section
2 which defines contracts of employment as "any agreement, whether in writing or oral, express
or implied, whereby one person agrees to employ another and that other agrees to serve his
employer as an employee." Id. at 133. At issue, then, was with whom Cheng Yuen had
contracted. This requires an examination of common law rules.
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The tribunal looked to Ready Mixed Concrete and Market Investigation
Ltd. for guidance.57 It determined whether the relationship between the club
and Cheng Yuen had the requisite elements of control, including the provision
of a uniform, instructions about his duties, and the disciplinary power to
reduce his grade or to terminate his employment.58 These elements of control
outweighed the fact that he did not secure benefits normally furnished by an
employer.59 The High Court affirmed this decision.
However, the Privy Council found that the tribunal and the lower court's
reliance on dicta culled from earlier cases may have misled them.60 The Privy
Council found that "the arrangements between the club and the claimant went
no further than to amount to a license by the club to permit the claimant to
offer himself as a caddie for individual golfers on certain terms dictated by the
administrative convenience of the club and its members." 6' Furthermore, there
was "no mutual obligation that the club would employ him and that he would
work for the club in return for a wage., 62 Because he lacked an employment
contract with the club, he was not entitled to a termination allowance.
This brief evaluation of relevant case law suggests that the question of the
appropriate test to apply is perplexingly enigmatic. While one asserted merit
of common law is its ability to adapt to the changing needs of society, one vice
is its incremental approach which can lead to the creation of gossamer and
imprecise "distinctions which depend heavily on the facts of the individual
case." 63 Any inventory of applicable employee/contractor tests plausibly must
include a number of considerations. Those considerations potentially include:
(1) control,64 (2) integration,65 (3) an American inspired conception of
17 See id. at 134.
" See id.
'9 See Cheng Yuen, 1998 I.C.R. at 134.
60 See id. at 137-38.
61 Id. at 138.
62 Id.
63 McKendrick, supra note 2, at 136-37.
' See Yewens v. Noakes, 1880 Q.B.D. 530. Here one might ask whether the individual has
subjected herself to the personal command of another. See DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 11,
at 159-61. Another test asks whether the employer could order or require not only what was to
be done but how it should be done. See Collins v. Hertfordshire County Council, 1947 K.B.
598, 615.
65 This is arguably an "alternative to the control [test] which sees the essence of employment
as the employee's subjection to the rules and procedures of an organisation, rather than as
subjection to personal command .... " DEAKIN & MORRIs, supra note 11, at 162.
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economic reality,66 (4) mutuality of obligation,67 (5) the parties' choice61
tempered by a review of their actual intention, 9 (6) the burden of financial
risk,70 and (7) a multiple faceted approach.71 While such factors should be
assessed in light of the modem fluctuating character of employment relation-
ships,72 the parties' own choice may conflict with the actual degree of control
exercised by the employer. In addition, the parties' own choice may vary with
tax issues and other collateral concerns and may conflict with the actual
economic reality of the situation. Similarly, the lack of mutuality of obligation
can arise because the principal seeks to avoid the adverse implications of
mutuality. For example, characterizing the relationship as one of employment
implicates statutory employment protection rights. Whatever the common law
test employed, the pertinent issue is the determination of whether the
individual is subject to subordination (either formal [social] or economic or
both).73 As we shall see, the notion of economic and social subordination may
" See Hall v. Lorimer, 1994 W.L.R. 209 (holding a skilled technician who worked for 20
separate companies on a series of short-term engagements was self-employed for income tax
purposes); Lee Ting-Sang v. Cheung Chi-Keung, 1990 W.L.R. at 1178; Market Investigations,
Ltd. 1969 Q.B. 173 (citing with approval United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704,713 (1946)). One
argument for validating the economic reality test is that in some cases an individual may have
some discretion and therefore not fall fully within the control of the employer but may, in fact,
be economically dependent. See DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 11, at 162.
67 See Carmichael v. National Power, 1993 Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 301; Airfix Footwear Ltd.
v. Cope, 1978 I.C.R. 1210; O'Kelly v. Trusthouse Forte P.L.C., 1983 W.L.R. 605 (C.A.);
Tanton, 1999 Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 367 (C.A.) (stating that a right to provide a substitute worker
is inherently inconsistent with the existence of a contract of employment grounded in mutuality
of obligation).
" Courts ask whether the terms of agreement are inherently inconsistent with the agreement
of the parties. See Express and Echo Publications Ltd. v. Tanton, 1999 Indus. Rel. L. Rep. at
369 (citing the Chairman of the Employment Appeals Tribunal).
69 See id.
70 See Ready Mixed Concrete South East Ltd. v. Minister of Pensions and National
Insurance, 1968 Q.B. 497.
71 See DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 11, at 168-70.
72 See McKendrick, supra note 2, at 137. For commentary on the changing nature of work,
see Moore, supra note 1, at 667-78.
7' Hugh Collins argues that contracts of employment produce dual source subordination,
which depends on both market power (economic) and social power and which seems to include
bureaucratic power (or rule book power). Workers join bureaucratic organizations comprising
a hierarchy of ranks of employees and normally the consent of the parties legitimates any
subordination so created by contractual obligations. Bureaucracies impose subordination
through hierarchical social structure and disparities in economic power. This dual source of
subordination has the potential to lead to worker abuse by arbitrary employer action. See Hugh
Collins, Market Power, Bureaucratic Power, and the Contract of Employment, 15 INDUS. L. J.
1, 1-3 (1986) [hereinafter, Collins, Market Power]; see also OTTO KAHN-FREUND, LABOUR &
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allow us to simplify and compress the possible tests available and reconstruct
asserted tests as simply considerations which the courts should or will take
into account before rendering a decision. These considerations influence both
the application of the appropriate decision and the determination of the
appropriate tests (assuming an appropriate test can be discovered). In addition
to the common law, statutes often provide supplemental information regarding
tests for employment or contractor relationships.
III. STATUTORY DEFINITIONS
Under various statutes, an employee can be defined in deceptively simple
terms as one who works under a contract of employment.74 A contract of
employment is defined as working under a contract of service.75 While this
approach is somewhat circular, the scope of such legislation "rests upon the
common law tests as developed and applied over time by the courtS. ' 76 As
such, defining an employee under the statutes urgently implicates the analysis
examined in the preceding section. In addition, British statutory definitions
must be applied in a way which is consistent with United Kingdom obligations
under European Community law. However, the European Community accords
wide discretion to member states in defining the term employee.77
Notably, some statutes apply to traditional common law employees" as
well as to "workers," which might implicate a broader group of people than a
"contract of services." There are at least three current statutory definitions of
the term "worker." One is found within the Employment Rights Act, 1996,
section 230:
an individual who has entered or works under (or worked
under): (a) a contract of employment, or (b) any other
contract by which the individual undertakes to do or perform
THE LAW (1977).
"' See National Minimum Wage Act, 1998, ch. 16, § 54(l)-(2) (Eng.).
71 See generally, Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act, 1992, ch. 52, §
295(1) (Eng.) and the Employment Rights Act, 1996, ch. 18, § 230(1) (Eng.). By contrast,
neither the Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, nor the Race Discrimination Act, 1976, define
employee. See SELWYN, supra note 7, at 39.
76 DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 11, at 15 1.
77 See id.
79 See Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act, 1992, ch. 52, § 295 (Eng.)
(defining employee within the meaning of the Act as an individual who works under a contract
of service or apprenticeship).
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personally any work or services for another party to the
contract whose status is not by virtue of the contract that of
client or customer of any profession or business undertaking
carried on by the individual.79
Another definition of "worker," found in section 296 of the Trade Union and
Labour Relations (Consolidation)Act, states that:
a worker is an individual who works or seeks to work: (a)
under a contract of employment; or (b) under any other
contract by which he undertakes to do or perform personally
any work or services for another party to the contract who is
not a professional client of his; or (c) in employment under or
for the purposes of a government department (otherwise than
as a member of the armed forces).. 80
In still another statute, "worker" largely means:
an individual who has entered into or works under... (a) a
contract of employment; or (b) any other contract, whether
express or implied... whereby the individual undertakes to
do or perform personally any work or services for another
party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of the
contract that of a client or customer of any profession or
business undertaking carried on by the individual.8
All three of these statutory definitions implicate both the common law rules
of employment based on contract as well as the more modem notion of
economic and social dependency based on personal service. These statutory
approaches are important if, as one observer contends, the economy confronts
a new pattern of "vertical disintegration of production," which transforms
employees into subcontractors thus enabling management to substitute
commercial contracts for employment relations. This is attributable to the
fact that "[d]espite the form of the contractual relation.., in substance the
workers frequently appear to be in an equivalent position of social subordina-
"' Employment Rights Act, 1996, Ch. 18, § 230(3) (Eng.).
go Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act, 1992, Ch. 52, § 296 (Eng.).
a" National Minimum Wage Act, 1998, ch. 8, § 54(3) (Eng.).
82 See Collins, Independent Contractors, supra note 20, at 353.
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tion and economic dependence to that of ordinary employees.
Additionally, income tax and social security statutes "divide the labour force
into the two principal groups of employees and the self-employed. 84 Taken
together, these statutes counsel concern for (1) the existence or nonexistence
of a contract of service or employment and/or (2) a determination of whether
the individual works personally for another. Having hinted at the applicable
tests in both statutory and common law settings, it is necessary to examine
briefly how the various tests have actually been applied.
IV. APPLYING THE APPROPRIATE TESTS
In applying the disparate tests available, the courts have not always been
consistent. In O'Kelly v. Trusthouse Forte P.L.C.,85 the industrial tribunal
assembled a list of at least eighteen different relevant factors for consideration.
Some of these factors, such as the lack of any financial investment by workers
into their company, were considered consistent with the existence of a contract
of employment.8 6 Other factors were considered not inconsistent with a
contract of employment such as whether the applicants were only paid for
work actually performed and the fact that they were not subject to regular
working hours." Still other factors were considered inconsistent with
employee status and include the ability to terminate contracts without notice
on either side and the view that the workers were independent contractors.88
This search process again hints at the idea that the courts are really looking for
economic and social subordination. Yet, some courts apparently have
difficulty articulating that search. Others are a bit more transparent.
For example, in McMeechan v. Secretary of State for Employment," the
Court of Appeal cited with approval the conclusion in O 'Kelly that because no
single factor is by itself decisive, the trier of fact must consider all aspects of
the relationship between the individual and the employer.90 In essence, the
McMeechan court opted for a balancing test to ascertain whether the person
was running a business on her own account. Reference might be made to such
questions as (1) whether mutuality of obligation exists (here that means was
13 Id. at 354.
84 DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 11, at 152.
" 1983 W.L.R. 605 (C.A.).
816 See DEAKIN & MORRIs, supra note 11, at 169-70.
87 See id. at 170.
81 See id.
'9 1997 I.C.R. 549 (C.A.).
90 See id. at 555.
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there an absence of a duty on one side to provide work); (2) whether there is
an absence on the other side of any obligation to do such work as was
voluntarily provided (is there mutuality with respect to the expected continuity
of employment); (3) who is in control; and (4) is there in fact continuity of
employment."
The courts concede that the appropriate distinction between a contract of
service (employment) and a contract for services (an independent contractor)
is elusive and that no single test is available. 92 However, recall that the Privy
Council announced its support for the general criteria derived from Market
Investigations Ltd. v. Minister of Social Security.93 The question to be asked
is: " 'Is the person who has engaged himself to perform these services
performing them as a person in business on his own account?' If the answer
to that question is 'yes,' then the contract is a contract for services. If the
answer is 'no,' then the contract is a contract of service."94 The court must
then compile a list of plausible considerations that can be utilized to catalog
the case and to flesh out an answer to the appropriate test or rules. Careful
examination of the plausible considerations will enable the court and
commentators to support, if not discover, a particular answer.95 For instance,
in Market Investigations, the court assessed facts concerning the individuals,
such as whether the individual (a) was under the control of another, (b) bore
the financial risk, (c) profited from good management skills, (d) provided the
necessary equipment, (e) hired substitute workers when unavailable for a given
job, (f) was paid on a piecework basis, and (g) invested his own capital.96
Of course, the question to ask is whether the courts have provided tests or
policies. Focusing on how an individual is paid, whether she invests her own
capital, whether the individual can hire substitutes, whether she bears a
financial risk, or whether she is subject to control seems to imply a dominant
concern with the level and degree of economic and perhaps bureaucratic
subordination, rather than the specific test or its particular application.
Whether test or policy, incomplete comprehension of these matters would
occur without some understanding of the courts' attempt to decide whether this
issue is one of fact, law, or a mixed question of fact and law.
91 See id.
9' See id.
9' See Lee Ting Sang, 1990 W.L.R. 1173 (citing with approval Market Investigations, 1969
Q.B. at 184-85).
94 Market Investigations Ltd., 1969 Q.B. at 184.
9' See Lee Ting Sang, 1990 W.L.R. at 1176-77.
96 See id.
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V. FACT OR LAW
Many cases which aspire to clarify the appropriate test to be applied when
determining whether dependent labor is present also illuminate the fact versus
law distinction. This distinction is important, as it enables or prevents
appellate courts from reviewing the case. Without principled appellate review,
actual instances of subordination may remain wrongly classified. "Prior to
O'Kelly there were numerous decisions in which it was either expressly stated
or implicitly assumed that the question of whether a particular contract is a
contract of employment or some other kind of contract is a question of law to
which there is a right and a wrong answer.... 97 This perspective encouraged
appellate review. For example, in O 'Kelly, the Court of Appeal decided that
the application of the legal criteria for identifying a contract of employment
was a question of mixed law and fact to which several correct answers are
possible.9" In deciding against the plaintiffs, who were regular casual workers,
the court found that there was a lack of mutuality of obligation.99 Furthermore,
in Davies v. Presbyterian Church of Wales, " construing the terms of a written
contract, the House of Lords held that the employment status of a church
minister was a question of law. Moreover, in Hellyer Brothers Ltd. v.
McLeod,'' the Court of Appeal was called upon to decide an arrangement
based in both conduct and writing. 0 2 There were two issues: (a) did the
Appeals Tribunal misdirect itself on the law in reversing the Industrial
Tribunal's decision and (b) whether continuity of employment was sufficiently
evidenced.'0 3 Here, the appellate panel "distinguished Davies and preserved
the status of O 'Kelly on the grounds that the former was a decision concerning
the construction of a written contract, whereas the latter, involving an
arrangement based partly on conduct and partly on writing, fell to be decided
as a question of mixed fact and law."'" Is there good reason for drawing a
distinction between a written contract and an arrangement based partly on
conduct and partly on writing? One may fail to find a principle to cabin such
a distinction or infer it from the relevant provisions of the employment
97 DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 11, at 154.
98 OKelly, 1983 W.L.R. 605.
99 See id.
'00 1986 W.L.R. 323 (noting the exception that where the relationship is dependent solely
upon the true construction of a written document, it is regarded as a question of law).
101 1987 W.L.R. 728
102 See id.
103 See id.
'04 DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 11, at 154.
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protection legislation. The legislation implicitly negates such a distinction,
defining a contract of employment as a 'contract of service ...whether
express or implied .... 10' In addition, other decisions have intelligibly
confirmed that the determination that a contract contains an implied term, as
suggested by the applicants in O'Kelly, is one of law. Notwithstanding these
conclusions, it seems that courts are more inclined to give greater weight to
complete and written statements of the parties' intent. Where parties possess
similar access to information and are able to engage in alternative employment
or engage alternative contractors, the court's deference to the parties' intent
may be logical yet inconsistent with the law. In any case, where there is a
written agreement, there is authority for the proposition that the determination
of intent is a question of law.
More recent authority states that whether a given set of facts supports the
claim that the relationship is a "contract of service" or a "contract for services"
is a question of law.106 For instance, in Carmichael v. National Power, the
Court of Appeal determined that the standard for reversing a lower panel
decision requires that the lower court must have committed an error of law
which can be shown either where there was no evidence to support the lower
court's finding or where the findings can be shown to be so excessively against
the weight of evidence as to be demonstrably wrong. 07
Despite the Carmichael decision, the prevailing conviction is that
determination of whether the individual is employed under a contract of
service or a contract for services is one of fact, or a mixed question of fact and
law, unless there is a complete written agreement at issue. For example, in one
prominent case, the Privy Council stated that the work "relationship has to be
determined by an investigation and evaluation of the factual circumstances in
which the work is performed... ."0' When reviewing trial court and tribunal
rulings, appellate courts should defer to the factual conclusions of those lower
courts.'09 Lord Griffiths argues that unless the relationship is dependent solely
upon the true construction of a written document, it was "firmly established
that the question of employee status was a question of fact. . . ."" At first
glance, Lord Griffiths' argument seems strange because "whether or not a
certain set of facts should be classified under one legal head rather than
105 Id. (emphasis added).
'o See Carmichael v. National Power, 1998 Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 301.
107 See id,
"o' Lee Ting Sang, 1990 W.L.R. at 1178.
'09 See id.
110 Id.
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another would appear to be a question of law."' Yet the rule is explicable.' 12
"[B]ecause of the difficulty of devising a conclusive test to resolve the
question and the threat of the appellate courts being crushed by the weight of
appeals if the many borderline cases were considered to be questions of law,"
the courts have concluded that the determination is typically now one of
fact. 13 In truth, the determination that this issue is one of fact or of mixed law
and fact is a statement of convenience that allows the appellate courts to
decline to either hear or to overturn lower courts or Employment Tribunal
Decisions.
This review implies that English courts have added to the confusion by
engaging in strained decision-making on the issue of whether employment or
independent contractor status is a question of fact or law. Arguably, because
of the difficulty in reaching a dispositive conclusion as to the appropriate
standard for deciding whether the relationship is a "contract of service" or a
"contract for services," British courts have embraced a procedural solution to
ascertain whether appellant intervention is necessary. If the lower court is
simply wrong but within a band of reasonableness, the appellate court can
decline to hear the case. Where the lower court has committed a flagrant error,
however, the error can now be characterized as one of law, and the appeal may
proceed. This does not mean the appellate courts are relieved of their
responsibility. "4 The appellate court is permitted to "intervene in a case where
the employment tribunal misconstrues the meaning of contractual documents
or fails to apply the correct test for the implication of a contract term, since
these amount to errors of law."' 5 Furthermore, employers and principals who
successfully insist on a complete written agreement are more likely to find that
such agreements shield them from employment protection obligations, if that
is their intent.
VI. ANALYSIS
The determination of whether dependent or independent labor exists
remains a formidable and complex task in both Great Britain and within other
common lawjurisdictions. Lacunae in statutory enactments continue to force
"I Id.
112 See DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 11, at 155.
113 Lee Ting Sang, 1990 W.L.R. at 1178.
114 See Carmichael, 1998 Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 301.
"s DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 11, at 155.
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the courts, tribunals, and various other entities to return to an exasperatingly
confusing investigation of the common law principles and standards.
However, one potentially fruitful and clarifying avenue of attack is
available. Consider two previously mentioned cases along with a third. First,
recall O 'Kelly, where the tribunal appraised a plethora of factors in deciding
whether certain casual workers (on-call table servers) were employees or
independent contractors." 6 Second, the issue in Ready Mixed Concrete was
whether a lorry (truck) driver, who delivered cement under a contract of self-
employment and who bought the lorry from the principal but who had to drive
for the company for a certain number of hours per week, find his own
replacement if he were unavailable, and comply with reasonable orders from
the principal, was in fact an employee for insurance purposes." 7 In "both
Ready Mixed Concrete and O'Kelly there was clear evidence of both personal
and economic dependence between worker and employer. In each case the
worker consistently contracted with the same employer, was required to obey
certain, reasonable orders and was dependent on that employer for continuing
work and income."8 This analysis is consistent with an approach drawn from
an examination of the underlying assumptions that govern contracts of
employment."9 The approach contests the notion that contract relationships
arise from agreement by parties who both possess the same economic, social,
and political power. Disparities in economic power are typically self-evident.
Rigid adherence to the common law is likely to incorporate archetypal models
of master and servant and may sustain more than economic subordination
derived from the notion of control. 20 For instance, an inherent tension exists
between the social demands of the employment relationship and the spirit of
the common law which is not concerned with the balance of bargaining power
as it is inspired by a belief in the equality (real or fictitious) of individuals. 12'
From this perspective, "[c]ontracts engender relations of power. Normally,
however, the consent of the parties legitimates any subordination created by
116 O'Kelly, 1983 W.L.R. 605.
"' Ready Mixed Concrete, 1968 Q.B. at 497.
... DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 11, at 170.
"9 See Harry Hutchison, Evolution, Consistency and Community: The Political, Social and
Economic Assumptions that Govern the Incorporation of Terms in British Employment
Contracts, 25 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. (forthcoming).
120 See WEDDERBURN, supra note 14, at 111.
121 PAUL DAVIES & MARK FREEDLAND, LABOUR LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 13
(Oxford 1993).
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the contractual obligations.' ' 22 Collins further contends that a clear perception
of subordination must accept the notion of its dual source. This dual source
of worker subordination is derived from both market and bureaucratic
power. 123 If this claim is persuasive, incorporating an expansive conception
of subordination may be helpful in clearly distinguishing between employment
and independent contractor relationships. If an employment relationship
exists, arguably there will be more subordination, more compliance with the
rules of the organization, and the individual will have fewer work options and
business alternatives. In addition, the importance of this approach can be
enhanced by the appellate court's willingness to declare that whether
subordination exists is a question of law which thus requires elevated scrutiny.
Such an approach would disregard the limitation placed on Davies and instead
require that Davies be broadened to require appellate review of all cases which
plausibly involve subordination whether dependent on a written instrument or
not.
For example, recall Cheng Yuen v. Royal Hong Kong Golf Club, where
Cheng Yuen was dependent on a strict rotation system with players being
allocated to the next caddie in line.'24 This system was based neither on
negotiations between Cheng Yuen and the Royal Hong Kong Golf Club nor on
an agreement between individual golfers and Cheng Yuen determining who he
worked for. The club determined this unilaterally. This situation suggests a
hierarchy which is consistent with social and bureaucratic subordination.
Despite the fact that Cheng Yuen "was free to attend work... when he pleased
and did not receive sick pay, holiday pay or have the benefit of a pension
scheme," his economic livelihood was dramatically tied to the club. 125 There
was no indication that he worked at other clubs or that he arranged to work for
particular golfers before coming to the club. In other words, he was
economically dependent on the Royal Hong Kong Golf Club and lacked
alternatives. Furthermore, one could ask whether his work primarily
benefitted the club which wished to serve golfers or whether the benefits
accrued largely to the golfers, with whom the Privy Council presumed Cheng
Yuen had a contractual relationship.'26 These and other considerations,
grounded on the urge to flesh out an enlarged assessment of subordination,
would help courts or employment tribunals determine that other similarly
22 Collins, Market Power, supra note 73, at 1. But see Richard Epstein, In Defense of the
Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947 (1984).
2'3 See Collins, Market Power, supra note 73, at 1-2.
124 Cheng Yuen [1998] I.C.R. at 131.
125 Id. at 132.
126 See id. at 138.
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situated caddies were in fact employees and not "independent" contractors.
Even if there was a putative agreement between the parties sufficient to
characterize the relationship as "contract for services," the court could assess
whether the "agreement" represented a freely bargained exchange or whether
it simply represented the absence of alternative employment for the individual
who had "agreed" to work for the master. In his admirable dissent, Lord
Hoffmann alludes to the reality of the situation to deflate the asserted
deficiency in Cheng Yuen's claim-the lack of mutuality of obligation needed
tojustify a "contract of service."' 27 While it was argued for the employer that
Cheng Yuen had to prove that he was employed under a continuing contract,
Lord Hoffmann observes that Cheng Yuen only had to show that:
when working at the club, he had been a casual employee, in
the same way as a casual waitress, gardener or labourer,
employed from time to time as and when he presented himself
for work and the club had work to offer. Provided that he was
an employee of the club at such times as he was actually
working, the effect of Schedule I to the Employment Ordi-
nance would be to deem him to have been in continuous
employment. And for the purpose of deciding whether he
was a casual employee, the fact that neither party was under
an obligation to employ or be employed is of course irrele-
vant. That is the nature of casual employment. The whole
purpose of Schedule 1 was to equate the position of a regular
casual employee with that of a person engaged under a
continuous contract of employment. 2 '
In other words, mutuality of obligation was a red herring which allowed the
majority of the court to disallow Cheng Yuen employment protection
regardless of his undeniable economic and social subordination. It is doubtful,
whatever the arrangement negotiated between Cheng Yuen and the club, that
the relationship was based on equality of bargaining power.'29 The club
determined the rate of pay, the manner of payment, for whom Cheng Yuen
would work, and when discipline was necessary. An expansive conception of
subordination would allow a court to decide that Cheng Yuen was an employee
whatever the "tests" applied and to disregard (1) the assertion that the club was
17 Id. at 139.
128 Cheng Yuen, 1998 I.C.R. at 139.
129 See id.
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acting as an agent for the members of the club or (2) that he held independent
contractor status. The club's reliance on the fact that it did not pay sick
benefits or holiday benefits to caddies "merely showed that it was consistent
in denying the caddies the rights to which as employees they were entitled.
Such self-serving acts cannot alter their legal status."'
' 30
The application ofan expansive conception of subordination to Express and
Echo Publications Ltd. yields a similar result. Surely the Court of Appeal is
correct in stating that clause 3.3 of Tanton's contract (if it is a contract)
allowing him to hire a substitute is arguably inconsistent with the view that he
is an employee.' 3' First, personal service is one of the hallmarks of employ-
ment derived from the notion of master-servant. Yet, an examination of the
history of the relationship between Tanton and Express and Echo Publications
indicates without contravention that Tanton was initially an employee.'
32
Second, at all relevant times, appropriate tax and national insurance contribu-
tions were deducted from Tanton's pay. Third, the manner in which he was
to perform his duties was highly regulated; the firm required him to pick up
and deliver newspapers in a particular order. Express and Echo Publications
provided the vehicle he was to drive. The company unilaterally fixed the rate
of pay and gave him a uniform. All of this evidence was obscured by the mere
fact that Tanton could and did hire a substitute. Accordingly, the trier of facts'
decision that he was an employee was reversed on appeal presumably as a
result of the teaching of Ready Mixed Concrete.'33 If one considers the
application of company rules to Tanton, the level of his economic dependence
and subordination to the controls of the company, and the seeming absence of
alternative employment options available to him, it is difficult for a rational
observer to agree with the assertion that Tanton was an independent contractor.
On the contrary, it seems that the court's decision was one of capricious
convenience.
Application of an expansive conception of subordination to the two earlier
examples drawn from the United States might likewise lead to the reversal of
both decisions while simultaneously enhancing consistency as well. Under the
typical sharefarming agreement, the landowner generally provides and
prepares the land, plants the crop, cultivates, sprays and fertilizes the crop, and
pays the costs of such activities. 134 In return,
30 Id. at 139-40.
'3' See Tanton, 1999 Indus. Rel. L. Rep. at 369.
132 See id.
133 See id.
134 See Glader, supra note 3, at 1455-56.
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the 'sharefarmer' agrees to furnish the labor necessary to care
for the land and plants during the growing season, to harvest
the . . . crop, and to sort, grade and pack the [crop] for
marketing by [the grower]. After the crop is sold, the grower
and sharefarmer equally split the gross proceeds of the
harvest. '
First, it is doubtful that equality of bargaining exists. Economic disparity
seems self-evident.'36 In addition, many, if not most sharefarmers lack
adequate alternative employment or independent contract opportunities. While
it can be argued that sharefarmers have some control over how labor is
furnished to care for the plants during the growing season or how the crops are
harvested, their latitude seems minimal at best. Beyond that, the specific
tasks required of sharefarmers are, in fact, determined by the growers.
Accordingly, it "is a stretch of the imagination.., to characterize today's
migrant farmworkers and their families as managers of 'independent farming
operations.' ,,17 On the contrary, "[i]n a majority of the contractual arrange-
ments between migrant workers and landowners, the farmworker exercises
little control over the care and management of the entire operation.""' In
addition, many sharefarmers lack the education necessary to understand the
written agreement fully and "often sign these independent contractor
agreements only because they are forced to as a condition of employment."'39
Indeed one of the prime, though not only, motivating factors for such
agreements is the desire by growers to avoid liability to employees under the
Fair Labor Standards Act. Growers accomplish this by "manipulating the
formal designation of their relationship with their migrant work force."'' 40 An
135 id.
136 This case can be analogized to United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713 (1946). In that
case, the Supreme Court announced its support for the economic realities test, premised on its
concern for inequality of bargaining power in controversies over wages, hours, and working
conditions. See id. at 715.
13' Glader, supra note 3, at 1466.
138 Id.
"9 Id. at 1467.
0 Id. One commentator adverts: "Pickle farmers in Ohio, Wisconsin, Michigan, Colorado,
and Texas directly, without recourse to a crewleader, recruit entire families of Mexican-
American farmworkers in South Texas to harvest their crop. They require the workers, as a
condition of employment, to sign a statement to the effect that they are independent contractors
and not employees." Marc Linder, Employees, Not-So-Independent Contractors, and the Case
ofMigrant Farmworkers: A Challenge to the 'Law and Economics 'Agency Doctrine, 15 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 435,438 (1986-87).
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expansive conception of economic and social subordination enforced by
elevated scrutiny at the appellate level should arguably deprive landowners of
the benefits which are attached to the contention that sharefarmers have
independent contractor status by vitiating the claim that it was the actual intent
of the parties which resulted in such "agreements."
On the other hand, an expansive yet principled conception of subordination
might serve to invalidate the decision in Vizcaino v. Microsoft.' Donna
Vizcaino, along with seven other highly skilled individuals, agreed to be
classified as independent contractors and not as employees in exchange for
higher cash compensation. 42 Later, they sought fringe benefits including
access to a stock plan that accrues to individuals classified as employees.'
Accordingly, they commenced a class action suit against the company after the
firm had, in response to an Internal Revenue Service investigation, reclassified
the independent contractors as common-law employees solely for tax
purposes. 44
The evidence adduced shows that the plaintiffs were made aware of
Microsoft's intention to decline to furnish these independent contractors with
employee benefits. 45 Unlike Alejandra Sanchez's father, all of the plaintiffs
were university-educated and one had a law degree. 46 Accordingly, it can
easily be argued that "[t]hey knew what they were getting into" and received
compensation in the form of "more cash on an hourly basis than regular
employees.' ' 47 The uncontroverted evidence clearly underscores the fact that
the plaintiffs understood the situation. Furthermore, their agreement cannot
be characterized as irrational. They were guaranteed more cash per hour both
141 97 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1996) [Vizcaino I], rev'd en banc, 120 F.3d 1006 (1997).
142 Skilled individuals who offer their services to the public are generally considered
independent contractors. See Silk, 331 U.S. at 715. To be sure, Vizcaino and her colleagues
might be able to distinguish themselves from physicians, dentists, public stenographers,
contractors, and the other specific categories discussed in Silk, but logically Vizcaino and her
colleagues fall much closer to those categories than to sharefarmers.
143 See Vizcaino, 120 F.3d at 1008.
'44 See id. at 1009. Microsoft agreed to reclassify the independent contractors as employees
for tax purposes but maintained that in effect such individuals were independent contractors for
benefit purposes. Notably, the pertinent Internal Revenue Code section, 26 U.S.C. § 423, does
not create a private right of action by plaintiffs against Microsoft. See Vizcaino 1, 97 F.3d at
1198. Microsoft did not contest the contention that individuals such as Vizcaino were
employees. Instead, Microsoft sought to reserve the question as to whether certain specific
individuals fell within the class as well as the question of the amounts due to class-members.
Id. at i190 n.l.
145 See Vizcaino 1, 97 F.3d at 1195, 1201-02 (Trott, J., dissenting).
146 See id. at 1201.
147 Id. at 1201-02 (emphasis in original).
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to avoid undertaking the risk attendant to benefits that might fluctuate with the
stock market and as consideration for the additional flexibility that Microsoft
and presumably they themselves wanted.'48
Admittedly, the plaintiffs worked with other individuals who were at all
times Microsoft employees. They were integrated into the bureaucratic
hierarchy of the firm. The company determined their hours of work, which
generally were the same for Microsoft employees. They also worked under the
same supervisors. And yet, after the unfavorable yet not dispositive IRS
decision, Microsoft divided the freelancers into two groups: those who were
offered permanent positions and those whose options were either to quit or to
become employees of a newly created temporary employment agency which
would pay them. 4 9 This analysis shows Microsoft's view of the freelancers'
job status: "If Microsoft considered them all as the equivalent of employees
and in fact had treated them as such from the date they were hired as the Ninth
Circuit suggested, one would logically assume that the company would have
converted all the freelancers into permanent employees."' 5 ° Instead, Microsoft
divided them up into two groups: employees whose employment was
dependent on other factors and task specific workers.' 5' Workers were so
classified because of the company's choice to maintain an ongoing relationship
with one group while maintaining only a task specific relationship with the
other. In fact, members of the contingent group were no longer needed after
their tasks were completed.' A paramount reason for hiring independent
contractors is the notion that they are hired for specific as opposed to ongoing
tasks.'53 While Microsoft's conduct is not by itself dispositive, this evidence
along with the initial agreement of the parties should be considered relevant.
As one British commentator stated,
in a finely balanced case, the parties' own view of their
relationship may tip the scales in one direction or another:
'since the law looks to substance and not to form, the fact that
the parties honestly intend that between themselves the
contract shall be a contract for services and not a contract of
service ... is a relevant fact. . .
148 See id.
149 See Kellogg, supra note 4, at 1799.
150 Id.
s ' See id. at 1799-1800.
151 See id. at 1800.
153 See id.
'14 DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note Ii, at 156.
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For instance, in Massey v. Crown Life Insurance Co., an accountant agreed to
enter into an independent contractor status after being informed of the cost and
benefits of doing so.' He then sought the benefits of employee status. In
response, Lord Denning stated: "Having made his bed as being self-employed,
he must lie on it."' 56 The primary justification for constraining or abolishing
the doctrine of at will employment is grounded in the belief that the contract
at will invites the exercise of arbitrary power by persons with dominant
economic positions against individuals whose mobility is said to be limited by
the structure of the labor market. 57 The "absence of viable alternative
employment opportunities is thought to leave employees vulnerable to
coercion and exploitation."' 8 On the other hand, in Vizcaino, fully informed
university-educated professionals who possessed employment alternatives and
options sought and received the benefits attached to economic subordination
without suffering the attendant cost. It is doubtful that they agreed to the deal
under circumstances of duress or because they lacked viable employment
alternatives. Even if that conclusion is clouded, only an unchecked imagina-
tion could agree with the perspective that grants such professionals more
protection than unskilled American sharefarmers and their eleven-year-old
children. A focus on "subordination reality," coupled with the consideration
of the absence or presence of viable employment options, informed by British
cases yet unencumbered by conflicting rules and rigid tests, may be helpful in
distinguishing those who are covered or who should be covered by existing
employment protection laws.
VII. CONCLUSION
It must be conceded that this modest exegesis of British labor law and its
application to a few American cases is not grounded in a compelling meta-
ethic nor in a defense of existing employment protection laws. Such laws may
or may not be justifiable. However, this article demonstrates that distinguish-
ing an employment relationship from independent contractor status is riven
with pitfalls, inconsistencies, and perhaps incoherence on a transnational basis.
This article provides a spare scaffold for constructing a more principled
approach to the knotty issues that surround labor and contractor relationships.
5 See 1978 I.C.R. 590 (C.A.).
156 Id. at 596.
117 See Epstein, supra note 122, at 949 (commenting on the argument raised against at will
employment while offering a spirited defense of the doctrine of at will employment).
158 Id.
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Given the changing nature of work in Britain, the United States, and
transnationally, a rigorous focus on an expanded conception of economic,
bureaucratic, and social subservience (perhaps labeled "subordination reality")
coupled with elevated appellate review may engender more consistency and
clarity in distinguishing dependent from independent labor. Given the
accelerated change within the global workplace and new forms of work, more
coherence, scrutiny, and additional research likely will be required in the
future.

